USA: A BRIEF CATECHISM FOR CATHOLIC VOTERS

        
   

          Question from Deborah Bloomfield on 10-16-2002:

     I read an article that was reprinted from ewtn.com by Rev.
Stephen Torraco, Ph.C. that begins by asking if conscience is the
same as my own opinions and feelings and continues with "Is it
morally permissible to vote for all candidates of a single party"
and more. I can't find the whole article. Please direct me. I'd like
to share it with others. Thank you!

     Answer by Fr. Stephen F. Torraco on 10-16-2002:
     A BRIEF CATECHISM FOR CATHOLIC VOTERS

     1. Isn't conscience the same as my own opinions and feelings?
And doesn't everyone have the right to his or her own conscience?

     Conscience is NOT the same as your opinions or feelings.
Conscience cannot be identical with your feelings because conscience
is the activity of your intellect in judging the rightness or
wrongness of your actions or omissions, past, present, or future,
while your feelings come from another part of your soul and should
be governed by your intellect and will. Conscience is not identical
with your opinions because your intellect bases its judgment upon
the natural moral law, which is inherent in your human nature and is
identical with the Ten Commandments. Unlike the civil laws made by
legislators, or the opinions that you hold, the natural moral law is
not anything that you invent, but rather discover within yourself
and is the governing norm of your conscience. In short, Conscience
is the voice of truth within you, and your opinions need to be in
harmony with that truth. As a Catholic, you have the benefit of the
Church's teaching authority or Magisterium endowed upon her by
Christ. The Magisterium assists you and all people of good will in
understanding the natural moral law as it relates to specific
issues. As a Catholic, you have the obligation to be correctly
informed and normed by the teaching of the Church's Magisterium. As
for your feelings, they need to be educated by virtue so as to be in
harmony with conscience's voice of truth. In this way, you will have
a sound conscience, according to which we you will feel guilty when
you are guilty, and feel morally upright when you are morally
upright. We should strive to avoid the two opposite extremes of a
lax conscience and a scrupulous conscience. Meeting the obligation
of continually attending to this formation of conscience will
increase the likelihood that, in the actual operation or activity of
conscience, you will act with a certain conscience, which clearly
perceives that a given concrete action is a good action that was
rightly done or should be done. Being correctly informed and certain
in the actual operation of conscience is the goal of the continuing
formation of conscience. Otherwise put, you should strive to avoid
being incorrectly informed and doubtful in the actual judgment of
conscience about a particular action or omission. You should never
act on a doubtful conscience.

     2. Is it morally permissible to vote for all candidates of a
single party?

     This would depend on the positions held by the candidates of a
single party. If any one or more of them held positions that were
opposed to the natural moral law, then it would not be morally
permissible to vote for all candidates of this one party. Your
correctly informed conscience transcends the bounds of any one
political party.

     3. If I think that a pro-abortion candidate will, on balance,
do much more for the culture of life than a pro-life candidate, why
may I not vote for the pro-abortion candidate?

     If a political candidate supported abortion, or any other
moral evil, such as assisted suicide and euthanasia, for that
matter, it would not be morally permissible for you to vote for that
person. This is because, in voting for such a person, you would
become an accomplice in the moral evil at issue. For this reason,
moral evils such as abortion, euthanasia and assisted suicide are
examples of a “disqualifying issue.” A disqualifying issue is one
which is of such gravity and importance that it allows for no
political maneuvering. It is an issue that strikes at the heart of
the human person and is non-negotiable. A disqualifying issue is one
of such enormity that by itself renders a candidate for office
unacceptable regardless of his position on other matters. You must
sacrifice your feelings on other issues because you know that you
cannot participate in any way in an approval of a violent and evil
violation of basic human rights. A candidate for office who supports
abortion rights or any other moral evil has disqualified himself as
a person that you can vote for. You do not have to vote for a person
because he is pro-life. But you may not vote for any candidate who
supports abortion rights. Key to understanding the point above about
“disqualifying issues” is the distinction between policy and moral
principle. On the one hand, there can be a legitimate variety of
approaches to accomplishing a morally acceptable goal. For example,
in a society's effort to distribute the goods of health care to its
citizens, there can be legitimate disagreement among citizens and
political candidates alike as to whether this or that health care
plan would most effectively accomplish society's goal. In the
pursuit of the best possible policy or strategy, technical as
distinct (although not separate) from moral reason is operative.
Technical reason is the kind of reasoning involved in arriving at
the most efficient or effective result. On the other hand, no policy
or strategy that is opposed to the moral principles of the natural
law is morally acceptable. Thus, technical reason should always be
subordinate to and normed by moral reason, the kind of reasoning
that is the activity of conscience and that is based on the natural
moral law.

     4. If I have strong feelings or opinions in favor of a
particular candidate, even if he is pro-abortion, why may I not vote
for him?

     As explained in question 1 above, neither your feelings nor
your opinions are identical with your conscience. Neither your
feelings nor your opinions can take the place of your conscience.
Your feelings and opinions should be governed by your conscience. If
the candidate about whom you have strong feelings or opinions is
pro-abortion, then your feelings and opinions need to be corrected
by your correctly informed conscience, which would tell you that it
is wrong for you to allow your feelings and opinions to give lesser
weight to the fact that the candidate supports a moral evil.

     5. If I may not vote for a pro-abortion candidate, then should
it not also be true that I can't vote for a pro-capital punishment
candidate?

     It is not correct to think of abortion and capital punishment
as the very same kind of moral issue. On the one hand, direct
abortion is an intrinsic evil, and cannot be justified for any
purpose or in any circumstances. On the other hand, the Church has
always taught that it is the right and responsibility of the
legitimate temporal authority to defend and preserve the common
good, and more specifically to defend citizens against the
aggressor. This defense against the aggressor may resort to the
death penalty if no other means of defense is sufficient. The point
here is that the death penalty is understood as an act of
self-defense on the part of civil society. In more recent times, in
his encyclical Evangelium Vitae, Pope John Paul II has taught that
the need for such self-defense to resort to the death penalty is
“rare, if not virtually nonexistent.” Thus, while the Pope is saying
that the burden of proving the need for the death penalty in
specific cases should rest on the shoulders of the legitimate
temporal authority, it remains true that the legitimate temporal
authority alone has the authority to determine if and when a “rare”
case arises that warrants the death penalty. Moreover, if such a
rare case does arise and requires resorting to capital punishment,
this societal act of self-defense would be a *morally good action*
even if it does have the unintended and unavoidable evil effect of
the death of the aggressor. Thus, unlike the case of abortion, it
would be morally irresponsible to rule out all such “rare”
possibilities a priori, just as it would be morally irresponsible to
apply the death penalty indiscriminately.

     6. If I think that a candidate who is pro-abortion has better
ideas to serve the poor, and the pro-life candidate has bad ideas
that will hurt the poor, why may I not vote for the candidate that
has the better ideas for serving the poor?

     Serving the poor is not only admirable, but also obligatory
for Catholics as an exercise of solidarity. Solidarity has to do
with the sharing of both spiritual and material goods, and with what
the Church calls the preferential option for the poor. This
preference means that we have the duty to give priority to helping
those most needful, both materially and spiritually. Beginning in
the family, solidarity extends to every human association, even to
the international moral order. Based on the response to question 3
above, two important points must be made. First, when it comes to
the matter of determining how social and economic policy can best
serve the poor, there can be a legitimate variety of approaches
proposed, and therefore legitimate disagreement among voters and
candidates for office. Secondly, solidarity can never be at the
price of embracing a “disqualifying issue.” Besides, when it comes
to the unborn, abortion is a most grievous offense against
solidarity, for the unborn are surely among society's most needful.
The right to life is a paramount issue because as Pope John Paul II
says it is “the first right, on which all the others are based, and
which cannot be recuperated once it is lost.” If a candidate for
office refuses solidarity with the unborn, he has laid the ground
for refusing solidarity with anyone.

     7. If a candidate says that he is personally opposed to
abortion but feels the need to vote for it under the circumstances,
doesn't this candidates personal opposition to abortion make it
morally permissible for me to vote for him, especially if I think
that his other views are the best for people, especially the poor?

     A candidate for office who says that he is personally opposed
to abortion but actually votes in favor of it is either fooling
himself or trying to fool you. Outside of the rare case in which a
hostage is forced against his will to perform evil actions with his
captors, a person who carries out an evil action? such as voting
for abortion? performs an immoral act, and his statement of
personal opposition to the moral evil of abortion is either
self-delusion or a lie. If you vote for such a candidate, you would
be an accomplice in advancing the moral evil of abortion. Therefore,
it is not morally permissible to vote for such a candidate for
office, even, as explained in questions 3 and 6 above, you think
that the candidate's other views are best for the poor.

     8. What if none of the candidates are completely pro-life?

     As Pope John Paul II explains in his encyclical, Evangelium
Vitae (The Gospel of Life), “…when it is not possible to overturn or
completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, whose
absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well known,
could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by
such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level
of general opinion and morality. This does not in fact represent an
illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate and
proper attempt to limit its evil aspects.” Logically, it follows
from these words of the Pope that a voter may likewise vote for that
candidate who will most likely limit the evils of abortion or any
other moral evil at issue.

     9. What if one leading candidate is anti-abortion except in
the cases of rape or incest, another leading candidate is completely
pro-abortion, and a trailing candidate, not likely to win, is
completely anti-abortion. Would I be obliged to vote for the
candidate not likely to win?

     In such a case, the Catholic voter may clearly choose to vote
for the candidate not likely to win. In addition, the Catholic voter
may assess that voting for that candidate might only benefit the
completely pro-abortion candidate, and, precisely for the purpose of
curtailing the evil of abortion, decide to vote for the leading
candidate that is anti-abortion but not perfectly so. This decision
would be in keeping with the words of the Pope quoted in question 8
above.

     10. What if all the candidates from whom I have to choose are
pro-abortion? Do I have to abstain from voting at all? What do I do?

     Obviously, one of these candidates is going to win the
election. Thus, in this dilemma, you should do your best to judge
which candidate would do the least moral harm. However, as explained
in question 5 above, you should not place a candidate who is
pro-capital punishment (and anti-abortion) in the same moral
category as a candidate who is pro-abortion. Faced with such a set
of candidates, there would be no moral dilemma, and the clear moral
obligation would be to vote for the candidate who is pro-capital
punishment, not necessarily because he is pro-capital punishment,
but because he is anti-abortion.

     11. Is not the Church's stand that abortion must be illegal a
bit of an exception? Does not the Church generally hold that
government should restrict its legislation of morality
significantly?

     The Church's teaching that abortion should be illegal is not
an exception. St. Thomas Aquinas put it this way: “Wherefore human
laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, *but
only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the
majority to abstain*; and *chiefly those that are to the hurt of
others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be
maintained: thus human law prohibits *murder*, theft and such
like.*” (** emphasis added.) Abortion qualifies as a grievous vice
that hurts others, and the lack of prohibition of this evil by
society is something by which human society cannot be maintained. As
Pope John Paul II has emphasized, the denial of the right to life,
in principle, sets the stage, in principle, for the denial of all
other rights.

     12. What about elected officials who happen to be of the same
party affiliation? Are they committing a sin by being in the same
party, even if they don't advocate pro-choice views? Are they guilty
by association?

     Being of the same political party as those who advocate
pro-abortion is indeed a serious evil *IF* I belong to this
political party IN ORDER TO ASSOCIATE MYSELF with that party's
advocacy of pro-abortion policies. However, it can also be true that
being of such a political party has as its purpose to change the
policies of the party. Of course, if this is the purpose, one would
have to consider whether it is reasonable to think the political
party's policies can be changed. Assuming that it is reasonable to
think so, then it would be morally justifiable to remain in that
political party. Remaining in that political party cannot be
instrumental in the advancing of pro-abortion policies (especially
if I am busily striving to change the party's policies) as can my
VOTING for candidates or for a political party with a pro-abortion
policy.

     13. What about voting for a pro-abortion person for something
like state treasurer, in which case the candidate would have no say
on matters of life in the capacity of her duties, it just happens to
be her personal position. This would not be a sin, right?

     If someone were running for state treasurer and that candidate
made it a point to state publicly that he was in favor of
exterminating people over the age of 70, would you vote for him? The
fact that the candidate has that evil in his mind tells you that
there are easily other evils in his mind; and the fact that he would
publicly state it is a danger signal. If personal character matters
in a political candidate, and personal character involves the kind
of thoughts a person harbors, then such a candidate who publicly
states that he is in favor of the evil of exterminating people over
the age of 70 ? or children who are unborn? has also disqualified
himself from receiving a Catholic's vote. I would go further and say
that such a candidate, in principle -- in the light of the natural
law -- disqualifies himself from public office.

     14. Is it a mortal sin to vote for a pro-abortion candidate?

     Except in the case in which a voter is faced with all
pro-abortion candidates (in which case, as explained in question 8
above, he or she strives to determine which of them would cause the
least damage in this regard), a candidate that is pro-abortion
disqualifies himself from receiving a Catholic's vote. This is
because being pro-abortion cannot simply be placed alongside the
candidate's other positions on Medicare and unemployment, for
example; and this is because abortion is intrinsically evil and
cannot be morally justified for any reason or set of circumstances.
To vote for such a candidate even with the knowledge that the
candidate is pro-abortion is to become an accomplice in the moral
evil of abortion. If the voter also knows this, then the voter sins
mortally.